This study examines 
. Introduction
I nvestment earnings made by insurance firms make a valuable contribution to their operating results and enable them to reduce premiums and increase dividends and bonuses, thereby improving their competitiveness 1 (Oppenheimer & Schlarbaum 1983; Smith 1989; Cummins & Grace 1994; Citibank 1994) . The financial economics literature suggests that contracting incentives for managers to increase investment earnings are dependent upon firm-specific factors such as organisational form and firm size. Using 1988-1993 data drawn from New Zealand's (NZ) life insurance industry, this study investigates empirically whether investment earnings are related to the characteristics of life insurance firms.
The motivation for the study is threefold. First, as major institutional investors, the investment activities of life insurance firms have important macroeconomic consequences for State monetary policy and the allocation of investment funds between sectors of the economy (Pesando 1974) . Insights into the investment behaviour of life insurance firms could thus assist government policymakers in determining whether investment regulations and other controls should be introduced (Smith 1989) . Second, empirical evidence linking investment earnings to firm-specific factors such as organisational form and size, could enable policyholders and shareholders to make better-informed insurance and investment choices. Third, despite the importance of the investment function, little empirical research has been conducted relating yields on invested assets to the characteristics of life insurance firms (Boose 1993) . In this regard, it is believed that this study is the first of its kind to be conducted in an insurance market outside the United States (US).
The empirical evidence reported in this study suggests that investment earnings were higher for stock companies than for mutuals. They were also positively associated with life insurance firms' size, leverage and underwriting risk. Life insurance firms holding proportionately more financial than non-financial assets have low investment yields. The liability structure of life insurance firms was unrelated to their investment earnings.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides background information on the NZ life insurance industry, while section 3 develops six testable hypotheses drawn from the financial economics literature. The fourth section describes the research design, including the data sources, the statistical model used and the measurement of the variables. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results, while section 6 concludes the paper.
. Institutional Background
T he business activities of NZ-based life insurance firms are governed by the Life Insurance Act 1908. The NZ life insurance industry is highly concentrated and largely unregulated (Commerce Clearing House 1991) . At the end of 1993, there were 34 direct life insurance writers, with the six largest firms accounting for approximately 70% of annual premium income. 2 Unlike the heavily regulated Australian market, for example, there are no compliance costs from filing quarterly returns and competition is not impeded by stringent licensing agreements and investment regulations. 3 Moreover, despite a well established State pension scheme, the life insurance industry plays a significant role in the small NZ economy (Carew 1987) . For example, in mid-1993 the industry held assets valued at NZ$13.28 billion (ie, approximately 15% of Gross Domestic Product), generating investment income of NZ$1.14 billion (Life Office Association of New Zealand 1993).
NZs relatively unregulated life insurance market makes it an interesting environment in which to examine empirically the proposition that investment earnings could be influenced by firm-specific factors. First, fund managers' ability to maximise investment earnings is not constrained by statutory controls on the assets in which life insurance firms may invest. 4 Second, taxation laws relating to NZs life insurance industry do not discriminate between mutuals and stock companies. 5 Thus, any variations observed in the investment earnings of mutuals and stock companies will not be influenced by differences in their taxation position. Third, 13 out of 20 NZ-based stock companies have a single shareholder (normally the overseas-based parent company), while the remainder (mainly NZowned) have relatively few shareholdings. Hence, there is a clear distinction between mutuals, which are widely held by policyholder-owners' and stock companies, which are closely held by few shareholders. 6
. Hypotheses Development
T his section puts forward six testable hypotheses drawn from the financial economics literature relating to the links between investment earnings and the characteristics of life insurance firms. The taxation of NZ life insurance firms involves a complicated and unique two-tier system whereby income tax liabilities are calculated both on the income of the firm (the life insurer base) and also on the income of policyholders (the policyholder base). For further information on the taxation of NZ life insurance firms refer to Sole (1995) . 6 An anonymous reviewer pointed out that many NZ-based life insurance companies are branches/subsidiaries of diffusely held stock corporations located overseas. As a result the agency issues concerning ownership may be removed to a different level. However, data on the ownership structure of entities based outside NZ were not available at the time this study was carried out. Furthermore, as the focus here is on the NZ life insurance industry, consideration of agency issues of ownership outside the NZ context is deemed to be outside the scope of this study.
Organisational Form
Two main forms of organisation dominate insurance markets-mutuals, that are owned nominally by policyholders, and stock companies that are owned by shareholders (Cummins & Weiss 1991) . Fama and Jensen (1985) , Mayers and Smith (1981 , 1982 , 1986 , 1988 , and Datta and Doherty (1990) , argue that there are different incentive conflicts between claimants in mutual and stock firms and accordingly, different rules over investment decisions have evolved. Mayers and Smith (1981 , 1982 , 1986 contend that the major contracting problem facing policyholders is to ensure that funds are sufficient to meet their long-term insurance claims as and when they fall due. 7 However, because policyholders in mutuals are unable to easily trade their property rights, the activities of their managers-unlike those of stock companies-cannot be constrained by the market for corporate control (Manne 1965) . 8 This constraint, together with the free-rider problem emanating from the disparate nature of the policyholderownership group, means that managers in mutuals are likely to be less closely monitored and controlled compared with their counterparts in stock companies. Therefore, managers in mutuals could dissipate investment earnings on risky projects and perquisite consumption without the knowledge of policyholderowners. Managers in mutuals could however offset the economic impact of dissipated investment earnings and satisfy policyholders' requirements (such as their policy bonus expectations) by other means, for example, by drawing on accumulated reserves or writing less risky insurance business (eg, see Smith & Stutzer 1995) . Thus, the yield on invested assets earned by less closely monitored managers in mutuals is expected to be systematically lower than for stock firms (Boose 1993) . As a consequence:
Hypothesis l : Ceteris paribus, stock companies are likely to report higher investment earnings than mutuals. Boose (1988 Boose ( , 1993 reports that in insurance markets, a high yield on invested assets could be due to scale economies in the investment function emanating from increased size (irrespective of organisational form). Large life insurance firms also tend to have the resources to employ specialist fund managers in-house who should be adept at maximising earnings on invested assets, whereas small life insurance firms are less likely to be able to afford such an expense, other things being equal. Furthermore, to maximise firm value and secure a stable flow of future 7 Policyholders with participatory rights (ie, with-profits) policies are likely to have some interest in the short-term profitability of the life insurance firm inasmuch as it affects their annual bonuses. However, to a large degree, policy bonuses (unlike dividends) may not be fully realised until the date of maturity. As a result, the primary interest of both 'participatory' and 'non-participatory' policyholders is likely to be in the sufficiency of long-term funds and corporate solvency. 8 Thirteen out of the 20 stock companies in NZ are subsidiaries/branches of parent companies resident overseas. However, as the single owner, the parent company is likely to have an interest in monitoring the activities of its managers of the NZ-based operation and to ensure that the business performance of that entity is sound (eg, to protect the value of the residual claims of the ultimate owners of the group). In the event of poor performance, the parent company can sell its interest in the NZ entity, and hence NZ managers would be subject to the market for corporate control. Indeed in 1989, General Accident Life (NZ) was sold to Prudential Assurance (NZ) and Royal Life (NZ) was sold to Sun Alliance Life (NZ) because of poor business performance.
Firm Size
dividends, residual claimants in larger life insurance firms are likely to give their managers more discretion to make investment decisions and take advantage of prospectively beneficial market opportunities than is the case with owners of smaller life insurance firms (Mayers & Smith 1993) . Boose (1988 Boose ( , 1993 cites evidence from the US life insurance industry indicating a positive and statistically significant relationship between firm size and the yield on invested assets. Since large life insurance firms are likely to realise economies of scale in the investment function and use the services of in-house fund managers, irrespective of the jurisdiction in which they operate, the second hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, the larger the size of life insurance firms, the higher the investment earnings they are likely to achieve.
Leverage
Investment earnings could be influenced by the capital structure of life insurance firms (Boose 1988) . For instance, cash flows generated from investments add to the reserves of life insurance firms enabling them to mitigate the risk of financial distress. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) high leverage engenders agency and other costs of contracting (eg, bankruptcy costs) because it provides incentive for residual claimants (ie, the owners) to increase the value of their claims while concomitantly reducing the value of the fixed claims of creditors. However, Jensen's (1986, p. 324 ) free cash flow hypothesis holds that '… debt creation … enables managers to effectively bond their promise (to debtholders) to pay out future cash flows' … (thus mitigating) the agency costs of free cash flow by reducing the cash flow available for spending at the discretion of manager …'. Berger, Herring and Szego (1995, p. 399) share this view and note that higher debt … puts pressure on managers to generate cash flows and avoid their loss of human capital from bankruptcy and … may give (them) incentives to work harder … and make better investment decisions'. Therefore, in highly leveraged life insurance firms, policyholders (or their actuarial representatives) could exercise control over the use of investment-generated free cash flows (eg, by means of internal rules) to ensure that their long-term insurance claims and bonus expectations are met. Managers could also be motivated to use free investment cash flows to maximise the long-tern interests of policyholders in order to enhance their promotional prospects in the internal and external job markets (eg, see Fama 1980) . Thus:
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, the more highly leveraged are life insurance firms, the higher the investment earnings they are likely to achieve.
Asset-Mix
Several researchers (eg, Pesando 1974; Quirin & Waters 1975; Foster 1975) report that the inflow of investment-generated cash flows could be influenced by the asset structure of insurance firms as well as being sensitive to external factors such as changes in interest rates and industry regulation. For example, investment in precautionary (& illiquid) non-financial assets (eg, property & mortgages) could generate low earnings in the short-term, but achieve stable capital growth over the long-term. In contrast, more speculative (& liquid) financial assets (eg, equities) could generate high earnings in the short-term, but with correspondingly greater uncertainty as to their value in the long-run. Regularly traded financial assets have easily determined values which enable owners to assess the value of their claims without the need for extensive (& costly) monitoring of managers. In contrast, it is relatively more difficult (& costly) to trade in non-financial assets because of high transaction costs such as valuation and conveyancing fees. This argument suggests that owners of life insurance firms with a high preponderance of nonfinancial assets are likely to impose tight controls over the investment activities of managers in order to avoid high transaction costs and mitigate the risk of financial distress. 9 Consequently, the asset-mix of firms could help to explain systematic variations in investment returns observed in life insurance markets (Boose 1988 (Boose , 1993 . 10 This reasoning leads to the fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, the greater the proportion of financial assets relative to non-financial assets by life insurance firms, the higher the investment earnings they are likely to achieve.
Liability-Mix
The investment choices of insurance firms are dependent upon the nature of the insurance policies that they have in force. Fund managers in life insurance firms typically seek to broadly match annual investment earnings with the type, terms and duration of policy liabilities that are outstanding at the date of the actuarial valuation in order to reduce overall business risk (Johnson 1990) . Life insurance firms with traditional business (eg, term life insurance) and guaranteed liabilities (eg, annuities) are thus likely to match those liabilities with assets (eg, fixed interest bonds) which provide stable earnings and capital growth over the period that the business is in force. Traditional life insurance firms are particularly vulnerable to variations in investment performance as profits (& losses) depend on how much investment earnings they can generate in excess of their contractual obligations to policyholders. At the other extreme, if life insurance firms write unit-linked business, the risks and rewards of investment are borne entirely by the policyholders, thereby obviating the need for fund managers to match closely investment earnings with outstanding liabilities. 11 This is not to say that unitlinked policyholders will be satisfied with poor investment performance. This would clearly affect the number of policies that continue to remain in-force as well as affect adversely rates of new business acquisition. However, unit-linked life insurance firms will not be immediately at risk from low investment earnings, provided sufficient reserves are maintained to meet any maturity or death benefit guarantees on policies. Therefore:
Hypothesis 5: Ceteris paribus, the greater the proportion of unit-linked to conventional business written by life insurance firms, the higher the investment earnings they are likely to achieve.
9 For example, Hoerger, Sloan and Hassan (1990) contend that bankruptcy costs are likely to be more severe for policyholders than shareholders because the latter are protected from the full financial effects of bankruptcy by limited liability. 10 In certain jurisdictions (eg, the US), the mix of assets held by an insurance company may be influenced by differential taxation rules pertaining to invested assets (Cummins & Grace 1994 ). 11 With unit-linked life insurance policies, premiums are invested in funds selected by the policyholder at the time the policy is written. Thereafter, the value of the unit-linked policy is represented by the market value of the underlying assets less any fees which may be payable on realisation.
Underwriting Risk
Firms which engage in risky business activities are likely to have uncertain future net cash inflows (Fama & Jensen 1983 ). Applied to the life insurance industry, this argument suggests that firms which increase the amount of risk assumed by writing life insurance with a potentially high exposure to loss (eg, insurance written on the lives of the elderly) will need to maximise investment earnings, or alternatively, introduce other risk management measures such as reinsurance, in order to prevent claim dilution and financial distress (Hoerger et al. 1990 ). This reasoning does not imply that life insurance firms writing risky lines of insurance business will be overly speculative in their investment activities. Rather it suggests that such firms are likely to maximise earnings on invested assets, but at the same time ensure the safety of the principal sum invested (Oppenheimer & Schlarbaum 1983) . Because high investment earnings enable life insurance firms to mitigate underwriting risk, firms engaged in more risky lines of insurance are likely to grant their managers more discretion in key functions such as investment. In contrast, life insurance firms engaged in less risky business activities could have less incentive to increase investment earnings in order to mitigate the risk of financial distress or to give their managers flexibility over investment decisions. Thus:
Hypothesis 6: Ceteris paribus, the greater the underwriting risk of life insurance firms, the greater the investment earnings they are likely to achieve.
. Research Design
T o test the six hypotheses, data were obtained from the published annual financial statements of NZ life insurance firms and the statutory returns filed by them with the Department of Justice under the Life Insurance Act 1908. The data covers the six years 1988-1993 and relates to all NZ-based life insurance firms. 12 This period represents the earliest and latest years for which complete data were available. Of the 193 firm/year observations covering the six-year period of examination, 84 are for mutuals and 109 for stock companies. To eliminate variation due to inflation, annual dollar values for the years 1989-1993 were adjusted by the corresponding consumer price index to convert them to real terms (1988 = base year).
The Weighted Least Squares (WLS) model employed in this study is expressed as follows: 13 where b 0 … b 6 are constants to be estimated; e it is a disturbance term; and it are the pooled variable observations for the six years 1988-1993. The pooled time series model is used in order to increase the degrees of freedom and so improve the precision of the parameter estimates. As in previous studies (eg, Boose 1988 Boose , 1993 , the dependent variable (EARN) is assumed to be serially independent. 14 The dependent variable was measured by the annual value of investment earnings adjusted for inflation (EARN). Following Boose (1988 Boose ( , 1993 investment earnings are defined as the percentage yield on invested assets net of transaction costs (eg, management fees) reported at year-end. The following independent variables were also used.
Organisational form (FORM): as in Mayers and Smith (1993) a dummy variable is used to represent organisational form, where 0 = mutual and 1 = stock.
Firm size (ln SIZE): following prior insurance industry studies (eg, Mayers & Smith 1993 ) this study uses the total market value of assets reported by life insurance firms at year-end as a proxy for size. The natural logarithmic transformation is used to alleviate the problem of extreme values in the data set. 15 Leverage (LEV): the capital-liability side of the balance sheet of life insurance firms comprise long-term policy liabilities, reserves and provisions, plus equity in the case of stock firms. Among life insurance firms, net worth is broadly defined as the residual of total assets less the actuarial value of long-term policy liabilities. The proxy for leverage employed in this study is the ratio of the value of long-term policy liabilities over the market value of total assets at year-end. 16 Asset-mix (AMIX): the asset structure of life insurance firms consists of financial assets (eg, equities) and non-financial assets (eg, property). Therefore, the proxy for asset-mix used in this study is the ratio of the reported market value of financial to non-financial assets at year-end.
Liability-mix (LMIX): the liability structure of life insurance firms reflects the nature of the business-in-force. In this study, liability mix is provided by the ratio of the annual value of unit-linked business-in-force over the actuarial value of all long-term policy liabilities at year-end.
Underwriting risk (RISK): underwriting risk is provided by the loss ratio. The loss ratio is defined as annual insurance losses incurred under life insurance policies (eg, maturities, mortality claims, surrenders & so on) divided by annual premium income reported at year-end.
. Empirical Results

Statistical Results
T able 1 gives the descriptive statistics for the variables included in this study. The descriptive statistics show that there is diversity in the size of life insurance firms. This finding reflects the fact that NZs life insurance industry 14 To test whether investment earnings are serially uncorrelated, correlation coefficients were computed between years. Statistically significant correlations (p ≤ 0.01) were found between 1988 and 1989 (r = 0.345) and 1988 and 1991 (r = 0.401) suggesting some degree of time-related dependency in the data set. 15 The log of annual premium income was also used as an alternative surrogate for firm size.
The statistical results remained unchanged and so are not reported. 16 This measure is a simple surrogate for leverage because actuaries are likely to use different assumptions when setting margins for adverse claims experience in their valuation of long-term policy liabilities. However, information on the margins used by actuaries was not available from published sources of data and is therefore an inherent limitation of this study.
is dominated by a small number of very large (mainly overseas-controlled) firms. The variation in firm size appears to be marginally greater for mutuals than it is for stock firms. The statistics presented in table 1 indicate that firms-irrespective of their organisational form-also vary substantially in terms of their asset-mix and underwriting risk. 
EARN
= annual investment earnings ln SIZE = log of annual market value of total assets LEV = the annual actuarial value of the life fund over the market value of total assets AMIX = ratio of the annual market value of non-financial to financial assets LMIX = annual value of unit-linked to non-unit-linked business-in-force RISK = proportion of annual insurance losses over annual premium income.
Pairwise correlation coefficients presented in table 2 reveal a statistically significant and positive association between the dependent variable EARN and independent variable ln SIZE (p ≤ 0.001). This result is consistent with the expectation that large life insurance firms are likely to report higher investment earnings than small life insurance firms. The ln SIZE variable is also positively correlated with LEV suggesting that the larger the life insurance firm, the lower the 'solvency margin' between the actuarial valuation of long-term policy liabilities and total assets. Thus, large life insurance firms may not necessarily have lower leverage (& thus be less prone to the risk of financial distress) compared with small life insurance firms. (n = 193); 1988-1993. 2 . EARN = annual investment earnings FORM = dummy variable coded 0 = mutual, 1 = stock ln SIZE = log of annual market value of total assets LEV = the annual actuarial value of the life fund over the market value of total assets AMIX = ratio of the annual market value of non-financial to financial assets LMIX = annual value of unit-linked to non-unit-linked business-inforce RISK = proportion of annual insurance losses over annual premium income. 3. Statistical significance of 0.001 or better (two-tailed).
4.
Coefficients between the binary variable FORM and other variables are computed using the non-parametric Spearman Rank correlation test.
Other coefficients are parametric Pearson Product Moment correlations.
A Mann-Whitney U-test was performed to determine whether there was any significant statistical relationship between EARN and FORM. The computed statistic (z = 3.40) is significant (p = 0.00) and consistent with the hypothesis that stock companies are likely to have higher investment earnings than mutuals. Mann-Whitney U -tests were also conducted between mutual and stock companies on the other five independent variables -ln SIZE, LEV, AMIX, LMIX and RISK, but the results are not statistically significant, thus supporting the low and non-statistically significant correlation coefficients reported in table 2. The results of fitting the WLS model described above are reported in table 3. They indicate that FORM was statistically significant (t = 6.44, p = 0.00). As predicted, stock companies achieve a higher yield on invested assets than mutuals, suggesting that managers in NZ stock companies could be monitored more closely by residual claimants than their counterparts in mutuals. This result also supports the evidence reported by Boose (1988 Boose ( , 1993 in her study in the US life insurance industry. The variable ln SIZE was also statistically significant (t = 7.52, p = 0.00), implying that large NZ-based life insurance firms could benefit from scale economies in their investment activities. In addition, it is plausible that large life insurance firms could employ specialist fund managers with the expertise necessary to maximise investment earnings. Again a direct and statistically significant relationship between investment earnings and firm size was found by Boose (1988 Boose ( , 1993 . 
= annual investment earnings FORM = dummy variable coded 0 = mutual, 1 = stock ln SIZE = log of annual market value of total assets LEV = the annual actuarial value of the life fund over the market value of total assets AMIX = ratio of the annual market value of non-financial to financial assets LMIX = annual value of unit-linked to non-unit-linked business-in-force RISK = proportion of annual insurance losses over annual premium income. White's test for heteroscedasticity on original Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates indicated that the null hypothesis of equal variance across sample years was rejected at the 0.05 level (ie, computed χ 2 = 14.457, with 6 d.f.). The normality of the disturbances was tested using the Jarque-Bera statistic. The null hypothesis of normality of the residuals could not be rejected since the calculated value of 5.182 is below the 5% critical χ 2 value of 5.991 (with 2 d.f.).
The evidence also indicates, as hypothesised, that the investment earnings of NZbased life insurance firms are statistically related to both LEV (t = 3.95, p = 0.00) and RISK (t = 2.60, p = 0.01). Therefore, high leverage could motivate managers in life insurance firms to work harder to maximise investment earnings and reduce costly contracting (eg, bankruptcy costs). Moreover, managers in NZ-based firms which write risky life insurance business-which could result in unexpected underwriting losses due to high insurance claims-have incentive to offset such losses by maximising their investment earnings so that contractual obligations to policyholders are fulfilled. It is also plausible that managers in highly leveraged life insurance firms and/or firms engaged in risky activities could be motivated to maximise yield on invested assets in order to protect their job security and maintain existing rates of perquisite consumption.
The variable AMIX was statistically significant (t = -2.69, p = 0.00), but its sign was unexpectedly negative. Thus, NZ-based life insurance firms with proportionately more financial assets (eg, equities) appear to have lower investment earnings than life insurance firms holding proportionately more nonfinancial assets (eg, property). This evidence suggests that although the value of non-financial assets (particularly property) fell sharply in the study period, earnings generated from these assets does not appear to have declined at an equivalent rate compared with yields from other assets such as dividends on shares. This could indicate that for the six-year period covered by this study, the yield from equities had not recovered fully from the fall in dividends following the share market price crash of October 1987. It is also possible that life insurance firms could be retaining high levels of low yield liquid assets (such as short-term deposits) in order to meet expected claims on policies-in-force. 17 The variable LMIX was found not to be significant (t = 0.32, p = 0.37), suggesting that the investment earnings of NZ-based life insurance firms are not influenced by the mix of unit-linked and conventional policy liabilities which they have in-force.
Diagnostics
To test the validity of the pooled regression estimates, formal diagnostic checks were carried out in the manner prescribed by Neter, Wasserman and Kutner (1985) . In addition to carrying out a check for homoscedasticity (see footnote l3), normality of the disturbances was tested using the Jarque-Bera statistic. This tests the distribution of the residuals for symmetry and kurtosis. The null hypothesis of normality of the residuals could not be rejected (χ 2 = 5.18, d.f. = 2, p > 0.05).
The statistically significant correlation between the independent variables ln SIZE and LEV reported in table 2 raises the possibility that interpretation of the coefficients may be inefficient due to collinearity. However, it was felt that solutions to prospective collinearity problems such as omitting the offending variables, could lead to model misspecification due to the small number of independent variables. 18 Moreover, econometric sources such as Judge, Griffiths, Hill and Lee (1980, p. 459) , consider that correlation coefficients are only 17 In recent years, the high claims experience of NZ life insurance firms, particularly with regard to policy surrenders, has been widely reported by industry commentators (eg, Life Office Association of New Zealand 1993). 18 As a sensitivity test, the model was re-run without the variable ln SIZE. When this test was performed, the R 2 decreased from 0.568 to 0.482 (adjusted R2 fell from 0.544 to 0.459), suggesting that deleting variables, such as ln SIZE, from the model to alleviate collinearity is likely to reduce its explanatory power and could lead to misspecification bias. Dropping ln SIZE did not have any major effect on the statistical significance of the regression coefficients or the direction of their signs.
indicative of serious collinearity if they exceed 0.80, and if the model is associated with both a high R 2 and statistically insignificant t-statistics among the coefficients. However, as multicollinearity can exist between more than two independent variables, latent roots derived from a vector of dependent and independent variables were computed to ascertain the magnitude of 'hidden' collinearity. Since no latent root was less than 0.10, interaction between the independent variables does not appear to be severe (Sharma & James 1981) . By these standards, the statistical properties of the numerical estimates computed in this study are not made inefficient by the effects of possible model collinearity.
. Conclusion
G uided by prior insurance industry-based research reported in the financial economics literature, this study has examined whether the investment earnings of life insurance firms are related to various organisational characteristics, namely form (mutuals versus stock companies), size, leverage, asset and liability-mix, and underwriting risk. The evidence presented here indicates that high investment earnings are associated with the stock form, large and highly leveraged firms, and life insurers with high underwriting risk. Contrary to expectations, life insurance firms holding relatively more financial to non-financial assets experience low investment earnings. The evidence also indicates that the liability structure of life insurance firms does not appear to be related to investment earnings. The strong statistical significance of most of the variables and the reasonable explanatory power of the model (R 2 = 0.568, adjusted R 2 = 0.544) suggests that contracting incentives emanating from the characteristics of life insurance firms could be important determinants of investment performance.
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